The Rosse-Panzar revenue test for competitive conditions in banking is based on observation of the impact on bank revenue of variation in factor input prices. We identify the implications for the RossePanzar H-statistic of misspecification bias in the revenue equation, arising when adjustment towards market equilibrium in response to factor input price shocks is partial and not instantaneous. In simulations, fixed effects estimation is shown to produce a measured H-statistic that is severely biased towards zero. A dynamic revenue equation allows virtually unbiased estimation. Empirical results are reported for the banking sectors of 19 developed and developing countries. 
Introduction
Competition in banking is important, because any form of market failure or anti-competitive behaviour on the part of banks has far-reaching implications for productive efficiency, consumer welfare and economic growth. At the microeconomic level, most households and businesses engage in transactions with banks, for deposits, loans and other financial services. At the macroeconomic level, banks perform a vital economic function in channelling funds from savers to investors, and in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Accordingly, the development of indicators of market power or competition in banking that are reliable, widely understood and generally accepted is a highly relevant exercise, carrying implications for competition policy, macroeconomic policy, financial stability, and for the effective regulation and supervision of the banking and financial services sector.
input prices. The standard procedure for estimation of the H-statistic involves the application of fixed effects (FE) regression to panel data for individual firms. Under this procedure, the correct identification of the H-statistic relies upon an assumption that markets are in long-run equilibrium at each point in time when the data are observed. In the present study, our main focus is on the implications of departures from this assumed product market equilibrium condition. Although the micro theory underlying the RossePanzar test is based on a static equilibrium framework, in practice adjustment towards equilibrium might well be less than instantaneous, and markets might be out of equilibrium either occasionally, or frequently, or always. This paper's principal contribution takes the form of an investigation of the implications for the estimation of the H-statistic of a form of misspecification bias in the revenue equation. Misspecification bias arises in the case where there is partial, not instantaneous, adjustment towards equilibrium in response to factor input price shocks. Partial adjustment necessitates the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable among the covariates of the revenue equation. Accordingly, the latter should have a dynamic structure, and the static version without a lagged dependent variable is misspecified.
A Monte Carlo simulations exercise demonstrates that when the true data generating process involves partial rather than instantaneous adjustment towards equilibrium, FE estimation of a static revenue equation produces a measured H-statistic that is severely biased towards zero. This bias has serious implications for the researcher's ability to distinguish accurately between the three theoretical market structures. In contrast, applying an appropriate dynamic panel estimator to a correctly specified dynamic revenue equation permits virtually unbiased estimation of the H-statistic. Dynamic panel estimation enables the researcher to assess the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium directly, through the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. This eliminates the need for a market equilibrium assumption, but still incorporates instantaneous adjustment as a special case.
We also report an empirical comparison between the performance of the FE and dynamic panel estimators of the Rosse-Panzar H-statistic, based on company accounts data for 19 national banking sectors. The empirical results are consistent with the main conclusions of the preceding simulations exercise, that the FE estimator of the H-statistic is severely biased towards zero.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the previous empirical literature on the application of the Rosse-Panzar test in banking, and makes the case for this test to be based on a dynamic or partial adjustment model, rather than a static or instantaneous adjustment model. Section 3 describes the design of a Monte Carlo simulations exercise, which identifies the implications for the standard FE estimation of the H-statistic of misspecification bias in the revenue equation, in the form of the omission of a lagged dependent variable from the list of covariates. Section 4 interprets the results of the Monte Carlo simulations exercise. Section 5 presents some empirical evidence, based on a sample of data on 5,192 banks from 19 countries. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2.
Measuring competitive conditions using the Rosse-Panzar revenue test
The Rosse-Panzar revenue test is usually implemented through FE estimation of the following regression, using firm-level panel data:
revenue equals average cost). The perceived number of competitor firms determines both the location and the price elasticity of the perceived demand function, denoted . Following an increase in AC, both output and the perceived number of competitor firms adjust in order to satisfy (i) and (ii). This adjustment produces a change in revenue that is positive, but proportionately smaller than the increase in the input prices. The numerical value of H is monotonic in , such that H1 as ||. In this sense, the numerical value of H within the range 0<H<1 can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of competition, within a spectrum of cases that are characterized by the monopolistic competition model. Under perfect competition, H=1. The representative firm holds its output constant and raises its price in proportion to the increase in average cost. 2 The algebraic derivations of these results are shown in Appendix I.
In applications of the Rosse-Panzar methodology to banking data, banks are treated as profitmaximizing single-product firms producing intermediation services. It is assumed there is no vertical product differentiation, and the cost structure is homogeneous across banks (De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Bikker, 2004; Shaffer, 2004) . In the first such study, Shaffer (1982) obtained 0<H<1 for a sample of New York banks. 3 In one of the most wide-ranging empirical studies to date, Claessens and Laeven (2004) report cross-sectional regressions that identify factors associated with the numerical value of H for 50 developed and developing countries. Competition is more intense in countries with low entry barriers and where there are few restrictions on banking activity. For accurate identification of the H-statistic using an estimated revenue equation based on a static equilibrium model, it is necessary to assume that markets are in long-run equilibrium at each point in time 2 In addition, it has been shown H<0 in the case of collusive oligopoly (joint profit maximization), and H=1 for a natural monopolist in a contestable market, and for a sales maximizer subject to a break-even constraint (Shaffer, 2004) . However, the sign of H is ambiguous across a broad class of conjectural variations oligopoly models, because the conjectural variations equilibrium could be located on either the elastic or the inelastic portion of the industry demand function (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) .
3 Using European banking data for 1986-89, Molyneux et al. (1994) Casu and Girardone (2006) and Staikouras and Koutsomanoli Fillipaki (2006) for the European Union; Gelos and Roldos (2004) and Yildrim and Philippatos (2007) for Latin America; and Matthews et al. (2007) for the UK. In contrast, Molyneux et al. (1996 ) obtained H<0 using 1986 when the data are observed. Shaffer (1982) proposed a test of the market equilibrium assumption.
Competitive capital markets should equalize risk-adjusted returns across banks in equilibrium.
Accordingly, the equilibrium profit rate should be uncorrelated with the factor input prices. This test is commonly implemented through FE estimation of the following regression:
In (2),  i,t =return on assets; w j,i,t and x i,t are defined as before; and  i,t is a random disturbance term. The Shaffer E-statistic is E =    J 1 j j . The market equilibrium condition is E=0.
Our focus in the present study is on the implications for the estimation of the H-and E-statistics of departures from the market equilibrium assumption in the product market. In order to motivate the use of a dynamic model, we conclude Section 2 by citing three alternative critiques of the comparative statics methodological approach on which (1) and (2) are based. The first critique stems from classic debates over the methodology of economic theory. The second is directed from a time-series econometrics perspective. The third is directed from a perspective articulated in the recent empirical industrial organization and banking literature.
First, according to Blaug (1980, p118) , "traditional microeconomics is largely, if not entirely, an analysis of timeless comparative statics, and as such it is strong on equilibrium outcomes but weak on the process whereby equilibrium is attained". Schumpeter (1954) regards static theory as operating at a higher level of abstraction than dynamic theory. The former ignores, while the latter takes into account, " ... past and (expected) future values of our variables, lags, sequences, rates of change, cumulative magnitudes, expectations, and so on" (op cit., p963). That this issue remains live today in the banking literature is evidenced by Stiroh and Strahan (2003, p81) . "Competition is perhaps the most fundamental idea in economics, and as firms fight for profits, the competitive paradigm makes clear dynamic predictions: strong performers should pass the market test and survive, while weak performers should shrink, exit or sell out. The transfer of market share from under-performers to more successful firms is a critical part of the competitive process, but this stylised picture is not always the reality. Regulation, uncertainty, and other entry barriers to entry can protect inefficient firms, limit entry and exit, and prevent the textbook competitive shakeout." Second, the absence of any dynamic effects in (1) and (2) creates the possibility that specifications of this type may be criticized from a perspective of time-series econometrics. If ln(r i,t ) is actually dependent on ln(r i,t-1 ), or if ln(1+ i,t ) is similarly dependent on ln(1+ i,t-1 ), then the misspecification of (1) and (2) results in a pattern of autocorrelation in the disturbance terms,  i,t or  i,t .
This creates difficulties for either FE or random effects (RE) estimation of (1) and (2). With small T and autocorrelated disturbances, the FE and RE estimators of  j and  j are biased toward zero, creating the potential for seriously misleading inferences to be drawn concerning the nature or intensity of competition. Although the FE and RE estimators of  j in (1) and  j in (2) are consistent as T, this property is of little comfort in the case where N may be quite large but T is small. This case is typical in the empirical banking literature. The implications of this critique for the measurement of competitive conditions are developed in Sections 3 and 4 below.
Third and finally, in the recent empirical industrial organization and banking literature, the estimation of dynamic models for the persistence of profit (POP) is motivated by Brozen's (1971) observation that while the relevant micro theory identifies equilibrium relationships between variables such as concentration and profitability, there is no certainty that any observed profit figure represents an equilibrium value. 4 In tests of the POP hypothesis for banking, Goddard et al. (2004a,b) find evidence that 4 In the POP model used by Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) , the change in a firm's profit rate, denoted  t and suppressing i-subscripts, is a function of the lagged profit rate denoted  t-1 , current and past entry denoted E t-j , and 'luck' denoted u t :
Entry is a function of past realizations of the profit rate:
Substituting and reparameterizing yields an autoregressive model for the profit rate: convergence towards long-run equilibrium is less than instantaneous. Berger et al. (2000) reach a similar conclusion using non-parametric techniques to measure persistence.
3.
Identification of misspecification bias in the estimated H-statistic
In Section 3, we describe the design of a Monte Carlo simulations exercise, which identifies the implications for the estimation of the H-and E-statistics of misspecification bias in (1) and (2), in the form of the omission of lagged dependent variables from the right-hand-sides of these equations.
For banks, it is natural to identify output, denoted y, with loans or assets, and price, denoted p, with the interest rate charged on the loans portfolio. An ROA (return on assets) profit rate measure is  = (py-c)/y, where c denotes total cost. For simplicity, we assume variations in c, y, p and  are driven by variations in the price of only one factor input. To generate the simulated price and output series, we feed the simulated factor input price series into the theoretical models of price and output determination under monopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect competition. In accordance with the discussion in Section 2, we allow for either instantaneous adjustment or partial adjustment towards equilibrium. The baseline parameter values used in the simulations are arbitrary and unimportant. We focus on the variation in the performance of the FE and dynamic panel estimators as the parameter values and adjustment assumptions are varied, under laboratory conditions. The simulations procedure is described briefly below. The full technical details follow the brief description. Each replication in the simulations consists of four steps. At
Step 1, we simulate the factor input price series. These simulated series are either white noise, or they are autocorrelated. At
Step 2, for
In practice, it is common to estimate an AR(1) specification for  t :
where  =  0 /(1- 1 ) denotes the long-run equilibrium profit rate. each factor input price series we simulate the series of market equilibrium values for output, price and (in the case of monopolistic competition only) the perceived number of competitor firms, under each of the three market structures: monopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect competition.
At
Step 3, for each factor input price series and for each market structure, we simulate 'actual' series for output, price and perceived number of competitor firms, under alternative assumptions of either instantaneous adjustment or partial adjustment. Under instantaneous adjustment, the 'actual' values diverge from the market equilibrium values randomly, through a stochastic disturbance term. Under partial adjustment, the 'actual' values diverge from the market equilibrium values both systematically, in accordance with a partial adjustment mechanism, and randomly through a stochastic disturbance term.
Step 4, for each factor input price series, for each market structure, and for instantaneous and for partial adjustment, we estimate revenue and profit equations using the simulated 'actual' price and output series, the simulated factor input price series, and (for the profit equation) a simulated cost series.
The equations are estimated using the standard FE panel estimator, and using a dynamic panel estimator, which, in contrast to FE, permits the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable among the covariates of the revenue and profit equations. The dynamic panel estimator is Arellano and Bond's (1991) generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure.
By repeating Steps 1 to 4 over a large number of replications, we obtain the simulated sampling distributions of the estimated FE and GMM H-and E-statistics. The results reported in Section 4 are based on 2,000 replications. In the rest of Section 3, we provide the full technical details of the procedure that has been outlined above. The notation is as follows: n=perceived number of competitor firms, w=factor input price, s=scale parameter, and y, p, c and  are as defined previously. is the equilibrium value of n for monopolistic competition. The subscripts 'i,t' appended to any variable denote values pertaining to bank i in year t. The subscript 'i' appended to the scale parameter s allows for heterogeneity in the bank size distribution. For simplicity, it is assumed that the scale parameter for bank i is time-invariant. The underlying bank size distribution is assumed to be lognormal, with s i =exp(z i ) and z i~N (0,1).
Step 1
For simplicity, we assume there is a single factor input. In order to simulate w i,t , the following partial adjustment mechanism is assumed:
The parameter  w represents the unconditional mean value of w i,t . The parameter  allows for autocorrelation in w i,t . We examine  = 0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, representing zero, 'low', 'medium' and 'high' autocorrelation in w i,t , respectively.
Step 2 The following functional forms are assumed for the inverse demand function and cost function:
In ( (monopolistic competition), and H=1.000 (perfect competition).
Step 3 The following partial adjustment equations are assumed for y i,t and p i,t for all three market structures, and for n i,t in the case of monopolistic competition:
In (6) ñ . The parameter  describes the adjustment speed for y i,t , p i,t and n i,t . In the simulations, we examine =0 (instantaneous adjustment) and =0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 (partial adjustment, at various speeds). It is possible to envisage different adjustment speeds for each of y i,t , p i,t and n i,t ; but in order to avoid a proliferation of parameters, we assume  is the same in all three cases.
For the purposes of calculating the E-statistic, a simulated total cost series is also required. This is based directly on (5) with a stochastic disturbance term added, as follows:
Equations (3) to (7) are used to generate simulated data for w i,t , y i,t , p i,t , n i,t and c i,t for a panel of N banks indexed i=1,...,N observed over T+2 years indexed t = -1,0,1,...,T.
5
5 Randomly generated N(0,1) deviates are used to obtain z i , and hence s i . Randomly generated N(0,1) deviates, scaled using  w ,  y ,  p and  n chosen for consistency with the (arbitrary) parameter values  w =0.02 in (3) and  y =20,  p =0.002 and  n =1 in (6), are used to obtain
Step 4 The partial adjustment equations for y i,t and p i,t in (6) establish r i,t =p i,t y i,t =f(p i,t-1 y i,t -1 , ...) or r i,t =f(r i,t-1 , ...), where f is a non-linear function also containing terms in p t-1 , y t-1 , k t , i p and
ỹ . An AR (1) model for r i,t can be interpreted as a linear approximation to f( ). An autoregressive structure for  i,t , as assumed in the standard POP model, can be similarly established. Accordingly, the following static and dynamic panel regressions are estimated using the simulated data:
Revenue equation
GMM:
FE estimation is implemented using the simulated data for t=1,...,T. For GMM estimation, the individual bank effects are eliminated prior to estimation, by applying a first-difference transformation to all variables. Two observations are sacrificed in creating the lagged dependent variable and the firstdifferences. Therefore GMM is implemented using the simulated data for t=-1,0,1,...,T, but only the observations for t=1,...,T are used in the estimation. The FE estimator of the H-statistic is
The GMM estimator is
for t=-100,...,-2 are immediately discarded. Randomly generated N(0,1) deviates, scaled using the (arbitrary)
parameter value  c =10 in (7), are used to obtain c t , i  .
Simulated sampling distributions of the FE and GMM estimators
In Section 4, we report the results of the Monte Carlo simulations exercise. For the H-statistic, Tables 1 and 2 Table 1 reports the results obtained by applying FE estimation, as in (8). Section 1 shows the means and standard deviations over the 2,000 replications of For monopoly, the mean F Ĥ is negative for all of the cases considered in Section 1 of Table 1 .
For monopolistic competition, the mean F Ĥ is positive for all cases considered. Therefore for >0
(partial adjustment), the biases in F Ĥ should not prevent the researcher from distinguishing correctly between these two market structures. For FE estimation, Section 1 of Table 2 shows the rejection rates over the 2,000 replications for z-tests of H 0 :H0 against H 1 :H<0 in the case where the true model is monopoly, and for z-tests of H 0 :H0 against H 1 :H>0 in the case where the true model is monopolistic competition. In both cases, H 0 should be rejected. The power of the former test is decreasing in both  and , but the loss of power becomes severe only towards the upper end of the ranges of values considered for  and . The power of the latter test is close to one over the full range considered.
Of more serious concern for the interpretation of the FE H-statistic is the finding that for both monopolistic competition and perfect competition with >0 (partial adjustment), the mean F Ĥ is positive but less than one for all of the cases considered in Section 1 of Table 1 . This downward bias in F Ĥ has serious implications for the researcher's ability to distinguish between monopolistic competition and perfect competition.
For FE estimation, Section 1 of For any >0, however, the z-test suffers from a severe size distortion under perfect competition. If banks'
pricing and output decisions are in accordance with perfect competition, but there is partial (rather than instantaneous) adjustment, it is highly likely that the test based on FE estimation will produce an incorrect diagnosis of monopolistic competition.
The remaining sections of Table 1 report the equivalent results for GMM estimation, as in (9).
Sections 2 and 3 report the means and standard deviations of  turns out to be less efficient than the FE estimator,
 is insensitive to variation in . However, G 1  tends toward zero as  increases. This tendency is in accordance with the logic of the partial adjustment model. The larger is , the weaker is the direct relationship between the factor input price and revenue in the same period. When  is large, the latter is driven more by its own lagged value and less by current factor input price shocks. Therefore the larger is , the smaller is the parameter  1 . The partial adjustment parameter, G 2  , is also insensitive to variation in . As expected, however,
 suffers from an appreciable loss of efficiency. Tables 3 and 4 explore the implications of variation in N and T for the performance of the FE and GMM estimators of the H-statistic, for the case =0.5 and =0.2 in (3) and (7). Within each of the 2,000 replications, there are 16 sets of simulated data for each market structure, comprising all available permutations of N=25, 50, 100, 200 and T=5, 10, 15, 20 . Table 3 indicates that the bias toward zero in the FE estimator Table 3 is increasing in both N and T. Table 4 reports the rejection probabilities for z-tests of the same null and alternative hypotheses as before, based on FE and GMM estimation. Under monopoly, the tests based on GMM are more likely than those based on FE to correctly reject H 0 :H0 in favour of H 1 :H<0 when N and T are both small (N=25, T=5). For both estimators, the power of these tests is rapidly increasing in both N and T. GMM does not consistently out-perform FE over all of the values of N and T considered. Similarly under monopolistic competition, the tests based on GMM are more likely than those based on FE to correctly reject H 0 :H0 in favour of H 1 :H>0, and to correctly reject H 0 :H=1 in favour of H 1 :H<1, when N and T are both small. Again, the power of these tests is generally increasing in N and T, and GMM does not consistently out-perform FE. Finally, under perfect competition, the size distortion for the tests of H 0 :H=1 against H 1 :H<1 is smaller for the tests based on FE than for those based on GMM when N and T are both small (N=25, T=5 or 10). Elsewhere, the size distortion is larger, and often much larger, in the tests based on FE. If the true model is perfect competition, the tests based on GMM are more likely, and in large samples much more likely, to provide the correct diagnosis than the tests based on FE. Tables 1 and 2, in the case N=100, T=10. 7 Table 5 reports the mean values for each estimated E-statistic as in (10) and (11) Under monopolistic competition and perfect competition, the E-statistic should be zero for =0
(instantaneous adjustment) and negative for >0 (partial adjustment). In the former case, an increase in factor prices results in instantaneous adjustment towards a new competitive equilibrium at which normal profit is once again realized. In the latter case, sub-normal profits are earned temporarily until the adjustment to the new competitive equilibrium is complete. The mean simulated values of both F Ê and G Ê reported in Table 5 are consistent with these conditions.
The test of H 0 :E=0 against H 1 :E<0 based on FE has the correct size for =0, but has relatively low power for >0. The test based on GMM is over-sized for =0, but has relatively high power for >0.
On these criteria, there appears to be no clear basis for preferring either estimation method for the profit equation. However, an implication of the argument developed above is that the E-statistic is in fact superfluous. If the model used to estimate the H-statistic is correctly specified, then a market equilibrium assumption is not essential for the accurate identification of the H-statistic. With a correctly specified model, the H-statistic can be estimated, without any serious problems of bias or inconsistency, under conditions of either instantaneous adjustment or partial adjustment.
Empirical results: FE and GMM estimation of the H-and E-statistics
In where r i,t is the ratio of revenue to total assets, and revenue is defined using either interest income or total (interest plus non-interest) income. We assume there are J=3 factor inputs: deposits, labour and fixed capital and equipment. The definitions of the factor input prices w j,i,t are: interest expenses / total deposits and money market funding (j=1); personnel costs / total assets (j=2); and operating and other expenses / total assets (j=3). 8 The control variables are: x 1,i,t = natural logarithm of total assets; x 2,i,t = equity / total assets; x 3,i,t = net loans / total assets; and a full set of individual year dummy variables. In the profit equation, the dependent variable is ln(1+ i,t ) where  i,t = return on assets. The covariates are the same as those for the revenue equation. There is a high level of sampling error associated with both estimation methods, which produces considerable variation in the estimated H-statistics and persistence coefficients for individual countries.
Nevertheless, several general conclusions can be drawn from these results. Table 6 reports the results from applying the two-step version of the GMM estimator. The validity of the overidentifying restrictions is rejected at the 1% level in one of the 19 estimations with interest income as dependent variable, and in three cases with total income as the dependent variable. The test for 2nd-order autocorrelation in the residuals is positive in 1 and 3 cases, respectively. In the GMM estimations of the revenue equation with interest income as the dependent variable, the coefficients on x 1,i,t (= natural logarithm of total assets) are positive and significant at the 5% level for 5 countries out of 19, and negative and significant for 1 country. (These results are not reported in Table 6 , but are available upon request from the authors). For the other covariates the numbers of significant coefficients are: for x 2,i,t (= equity / total assets) 10 positive; for x 3,i,t (= net loans / total assets) 7 positive and 3 negative. In the GMM estimations with total income as the dependent variable: for x 1,i,t , 7 positive and 2 negative; for x 2,i,t , 8 positive; for x 3,i,t , 1 positive and 11 negative. Third, there are some systematic differences between the estimation results for the Group A and B countries on the one hand, and Group C on the other. Using both FE and GMM estimation and using both revenue definitions, the mean estimated H-statistic is higher for Group C than for Groups A and B.
Although monopolistic competition appears to be the appropriate model in almost every case, competitive conditions in the banking sectors of Group C countries lean closer to the textbook model of perfect competition than do those of the countries in Groups A and B. Within Groups A and B, the finding that competition is less intense in Japan and in the two Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Norway) than it is elsewhere may be explained by a history, during the 1980s and 1990s, of difficulties in the banking sectors of these countries (Alley, 1993; Molyneux et al., 1996; Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005; Kim et al., 2005) . High levels of bad debt may have caused banks to exercise restraint in competing for new sources of revenue.
More generally, the results reported in Table 6 Table 6 appear consistent with this general pattern. Legal and economic entry barriers tend to be lower in developing banking systems, so competition tends to be more intense and short-run POP tends to be lower.
Conclusion
This study has examined the implications for the estimation of the Rosse-Panzar H-statistic of departures from assumed product market equilibrium conditions. Using the techniques that have been applied in the previous empirical literature on the measurement of competitive conditions in banking, a market equilibrium assumption is necessary for accurate estimation of the H-statistic. While the micro 10 Claessens and Laeven (2004) report estimates of the H-statistic for 50 countries, including all of those shown in Table 6 . They report the arithmetic mean of four estimated H-statistics for each country, obtained by estimating interest income and total income equations using FE and RE. The averages of their mean H-statistics for the countries included in the present sample are 0.582 for Group A, 0.593 for Group B, and 0.676 for Group C. To provide a direct comparison with the Claessens and Laeven results, we repeated the estimations of the static revenue equation (see Table 6 ) using RE. Using c/w i = x i , (A.13) and (A.14) can be written in matrix form as follows: 180 .181 .179 .182 .181 .183 .180 .182 .183 .185 .182 .183 0.3 .276 .275 .275 .274 .277 .275 .276 .274 .278 .277 .277 .274 0.4 .370 .370 .369 .369 .370 .370 .369 .369 .371 .372 .370 .369 0.0 .046 .046 .046 .048 .044 .045 .046 .047 .041 .043 .044 .047 0.1 .048 .048 .050 .049 .047 .047 .049 .234 -.237 -.236 -.237 .554 .556 .561 .559 .957 .962 .966 .962 0.2 -.229 -.234 -.233 -.238 .555 .555 .555 .557 .956 .959 .958 .961 0.3 -.227 -.234 -.227 -.232 .550 .544 .556 .553 .947 .942 .955 .951 0.4 -.226 -.221 -.224 -.224 .538 .547 .550 .556 .928 .940 .943 .950 0.0 .067 .073 .084 .110 .087 .093 .106 .136 .094 .098 .109 .136 0.1 .073 .082 .096 .126 .098 .105 .123 .157 .106 .112 .126 .158 0.2 .086 .093 .107 .144 .114 .120 .135 .180 .125 .127 .140 .182 0.3 .098 .107 .121 .158 .128 .134 .155 .199 .142 .144 .161 .202 0.4 .107 .120 .135 .178 .140 .156 .173 .229 .160 .173 .184 .236 Table 6 Estimation results: revenue equation Notes to Table 6 N obs is the number of bank-year observations used in each estimation. Only those countries for which at least 120 bank-year observations were available for the GMM estimation are included. N bank is the number of banks for which data were available in each estimation.  is the GMM estimated persistence coefficient (see equation (9)).
Standard errors of estimated coefficients are shown in italics. Sarg. is the p-value for the Sargan test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions in the GMM estimation. AR(2) is the p-value for the test for 2nd-order autocorrelation in the residuals from the GMM estimation. Notes to Table 7 N obs is the number of bank-year observations used in each estimation. Only those countries for which at least 100 bank-year observations were available for the GMM estimation are included. N bank is the number of banks for which data were available in each estimation.  is the GMM estimated persistence coefficient (see equation (11)).
Standard errors are shown in italics. Sargan is the p-value for the Sargan test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions in the GMM estimation. AR(2) is the p-value for the test for 2nd-order autocorrelation in the residuals from the GMM estimation.
